The war has, no doubt, had a tendency to strengthen the General
government, and to cause the people, to a great extent, to look
upon it as the supreme and exclusive national government, and to
regard the several State governments as subordinate instead of
co-ordinate governments. It is not improbable that the
Executive, since the outbreak of the rebellion, has proceeded
throughout on that supposition, and hence his extraordinary
assumptions of power; but when once peace is fully re-established
and the States have all resumed their normal position in the
Union, every State will be found prompt enough to resist any
attempt to encroach on its constitutional rights. Its instinct
of self-preservation will lead it to resist, and it will be
protected by both its own judiciary and that of the United
States.
The danger that the General government will usurp the rights of
the States is far less than the danger that the Executive will
usurp all the powers of Congress and the judiciary. Congress,
during the rebellion, clothed the President, as far as it could,
with dictatorial powers, and these powers the Executive continues
to exercise even after the rebellion is suppressed. They were
given and held under the rights of war, and for war purposes
only, and expired by natural limitation when the war ceased; but
the Executive forgets this, and, instead of calling Congress
together and submitting the work of reconstruction of the States
that seceded to its wisdom and authority, undertakes to
reconstruct them himself, as if he were an absolute sovereign;
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and the people seem to like it.
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