The extent and determination of the
secession movement were imperfectly understood, and the belief
among the supporters of the government, and, perhaps, of the
government itself, was, that it was a spasmodic movement for a
temporary purpose, rather than a fixed determination to found an
independent separate nationality; that it was and would be
sustained by the real majority of the people of none of the
States, with perhaps the exception of South Carolina; that the
true policy of the government would be to treat the seceders with
great forbearance, to avoid all measures likely to exasperate
them or to embarrass their loyal fellow-citizens, to act simply
on the defensive, and to leave the Union men in the several
seceding States to gain a political victory at the polls over the
secessionists, and to return their States to their normal
position in the Union.
The government may not have had much faith in this policy, and
Mr. Lincoln's personal authority might be cited to the effect
that it had not, but it was urged strongly by the Union men of
the Border States. The administration was hardly seated in
office, and its members were new men, without administrative
experience; the President, who had been legally elected indeed,
but without a majority of the popular votes, was far from having
the full confidence even of the party that elected him; opinions
were divided; party spirit ran high; the excitement was great,
the crisis was imminent, the government found itself left by its
predecessor without an army or a navy, and almost without arms or
ordnance; it knew not how far it could count on popular support,
and was hardly aware whom it could trust or should distrust; all
was hurry and confusion; and what could the government do but to
gain time, keep off active war as long as possible, conciliate
all it could, and take ground which at the time seemed likely to
rally the largest number of the people to its support? There
were men then, warm friends of the administration, and still
warmer friends of their country, who believed that a bolder, a
less timid, a less cautious policy would have been wiser, that in
revolutionary times boldness, what in other times would be
rashness, is the highest prudence, on the side of the government
as well as on the side of the revolution; that when once it has
shown itself, the rebellion that hesitates, deliberates, consults,
is defeated and so is the government.
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