Republican Rome attempted to guard against excessive centralism
by the tribunitial veto, or by the organization of a negative or
obstructive power. Mr. Calhoun thought this admirable, and
wished to effect the same end here, where it is secured by
other, more effective, and less objectionable means, by a State
veto on the acts of Congress, by a dual executive, and by
substituting concurrent for numerical majorities. Imperial Rome
gradually swept away the tribunitial veto, concentrated all
power in the hands of the emperor, became completely
centralized, and fell. The British constitution seeks the same
end by substituting estates for the state, and establishing a
mixed government, in which monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy
temper, check, or balance each other; but practically the
commons estate has become supreme, and the nobility govern not
in the house of lords, and can really influence public affairs
only through the house of commons. The principle of the British
constitution is not the division of the powers of government,
but the antagonism of estates, or rather of interests, trusting
to the obstructive influence of that antagonism to preserve the
government from pure centralism. Hence the study of the British
statesman is to manage diverse and antagonistic parties and
interests so as to gain the ability to act, which he can do only
by intrigue, cajolery, bribery in one form or another, and
corruption of every sort.
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